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THE AGENCY COSTS OF OVERVALUED
EQUITY
In the past few years, we have seen many fine com-
panies end up in ruins and have watched record
numbers of senior executives go to jail.And we will
surely hear of more investigations, more prison
terms, and more damaged reputations.
What went wrong? Were managers overtaken by a
fit of greed? Did they wake up one morning and
decide to be crooks? No, the root cause of the
problem was not the people but the system in
which they were operating – a system in which
equity can become so dangerously overvalued that
CEOs and CFOs find themselves caught in a
vicious cycle of ever higher stock valuations and
(in the not-too-long-run) ever greater destruction
of corporate and social value.
What Is Overvalued Equity?
Equity is overvalued when a firm’s stock price is
higher than its underlying value, when a company
cannot deliver the performance that would justify
that price.We can take a brief look at agency theo-
ry – an idea William Meckling and I wrote about in
1976 – as a way to think about the consequences of
overvalued equity. An agency relationship exists
whenever one or more people (principals,such as a
corporation’s shareholders) engage one or more
other people (agents, such as a corporation’s man-
agers) to perform a service. Of course, agents will
not always act in the best interests of the princi-
pals, and vice versa, and efforts to manage the con-
flicting interests of both parties in an agency rela-
tionship generate costs.
In part, the massive overvaluation of equity that
occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s was an
understandable market mistake. Society often
seems to overvalue what is new – in this case, high-
tech, telecommunications, and Internet ventures.
But this catastrophic overvaluation was also the
result of misleading data from managers, large
numbers of naïve investors, and breakdowns in the
agency relationships within companies, in invest-
ment and commercial banks, and in audit and law
firms many of whom knowingly contributed to the
misinformation and manipulation that fed the
overvaluation.
Gaming the System
I’ve written in recent years about the fundamental
problems of our corporate budgeting systems.
Because compensation is tied to budgets and tar-
gets, people are paid not for what they do but for
what they do relative to some target, which leads
people to manipulate both the setting of the tar-
gets and their numbers, to game the system.
Corporate managers and the financial markets have
been playing a similar game. Just as managers’ com-
pensation will suffer if they miss their internal tar-
gets, CEOs and CFOs know that the capital markets
will punish the entire firm if they miss analysts’ fore-
casts by as much as a penny. And just as managers
who meet or exceed their internal targets receive a
bonus, the capital markets reward a firm with a 3
percent premium for meeting or beating the ana-
lysts’ expectations at the end of a quarter. The only
way for managers to meet those expectations is to
cook their numbers, to mask the inherent uncertain-
ty in their businesses – that is, to lie.
Indeed, when I served on the boards of a couple of
large public companies, I learned that “earnings
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management” was an integral part of every top
manager’s job. But when managers smooth out
earnings to meet market projections, they’re not
creating value for the firm; they’re both lying and
making poor decisions that destroy value. I realize
that it is not fashionable to use such harsh lan-
guage to describe what are almost universal prac-
tices. But when numbers are manipulated to tell
the markets what they want to hear – it is lying,and
when real decisions, that would maximize value,
are compromised to meet market expectations real
long-term value is being destroyed.
Once you start lying, it’s nearly impossible to stop. If
you’re having trouble meeting the estimates for this
year, you push a few expenses forward. You pull
some revenues from next period into this period.
Revenues borrowed from the future and today’s
expenses pushed to tomorrow require even more
manipulation to forestall the day of reckoning.
Managerial Heroin
Like taking heroin, riding at the helm of an over-
valued company feels great at first. If you’re the
CEO or CFO, you’re on TV, investors love you,
your options are going through the roof, and the
capital markets are wide open. But as the heroin
user learns,massive pain lies ahead.You realize the
markets will hammer you unless your company’s
performance justifies the stock price, so you start
to take actions that you hope will at least appear to
generate the expected performance. But, by defin-
ition we know that you cannot, except by pure
luck, produce the performance required to justify
your overvalued stock price.You use your overval-
ued equity to make acquisitions to satisfy growth
expectations, you use your access to cheap debt
and equity capital to engage in excessive internal
spending and make risky investments, and eventu-
ally you turn to further manipulation and even
fraudulent practices. None of these actions truly
improve performance. In fact, they destroy part or
all of the firm’s core value. But what’s your alter-
native? How could you ever argue to your board
that a major effort must be made to reduce the
price of the stock?
In summary, overvalued equity sets up a set of
organizational forces that in the not-too-long run
will destroy value, and these organizational forces
are extremely difficult to stop.
Look at Enron. My guess is that at the time of
Enron’s peak market value of $70 billion, the com-
pany was actually worth about $30 billion. It was a
good, viable business; the company was a major
innovator. But senior managers’ efforts to defend
the $40 billion of excess valuation,which was noth-
ing but a big mistake – a mirage that was going to
go away anyway – cut in to the $30 billion core
value. Enron’s managers had a choice: they could
have helped the market reduce its expectations.
They could have found the courage to reset the
company’s value. Instead, they destroyed it.
Nortel is another case in point. Between 1997 and
2001, Nortel acquired 19 companies at a price of
more than $33 billion and paid for many of these
acquisitions with Nortel stock,which had increased
dramatically during that period. When the compa-
ny’s stock price fell 95 percent, all the acquisitions
were written off.Nortel destroyed those companies
and in doing so destroyed not only the corporate
value that the acquired companies – on their own –
could have generated but also the social value
those companies represented in the form of jobs
and products and services.
Because neither top managers nor board members
have had the language to talk about the danger of
overvalued equity, few have fully understood it.
And even those who have sensed the problem have
been unable to stop playing the game. The New
York Times Magazine published a piece in which
the author describes the scene on the floor of the
New York Stock Exchange as eToys’ stock price
skyrocketed on its first day of trading in May 1999.
CEO Toby Lenk was quoted as saying to his CFO,
“This is bad. We’re going to live to regret this.”
Lenk knew something was wrong, but he and his
management team went ahead and built the capac-
ity for $500 million in sales. Sales peaked at $200
million, and in February 2001, just 21 months after
that first heady day, the company filed for bank-
ruptcy protection and was eventually liquidated.
Walking the Straight and Narrow
I believe that the solution to the problem of mas-
sive overvaluation is to stop it from happening in
the first place. This means going against our very
human reluctance to endure short-term pain for
long-term benefits. We must refuse to play the
earnings management game.We must stop creatingand consuming the heroin. If our company’s stock
price gets too high, we must talk it down. And we
must help others in the business and financial com-
munities recognize that growth is not a synonym
for good:
• Senior managers must understand what drives
value in their organization and align internal
goals with those drivers, not with analysts’
expectations.
• Senior managers must promise only results they
believe they can deliver, and they must provide
investors and markets with auditable data on
the benchmarks that are critical to the achieve-
ment of their strategy.
• Business educators, while teaching students the
desirability of maximizing value,must also teach
them about the dangers of overvaluation.
Resetting corporate value and resetting the con-
versation between corporate management and
Wall Street won’t be easy, but I see a window of
opportunity. I hear people talking about the
malaise that has gripped the business world. I
know executives who are wondering how to invest
in their integrity. I see researchers starting to
examine some of the issues. It is now clear that
these actions have destroyed both value and per-
sonal and organizational reputations Because they
do not create value there is no long-run incentive
to continue them. Witness the destruction of
Arthur Anderson and the severe damage to the
reputation for other auditing firms, investment
banking firms, analysts, commercial banks and law
firms who played supporting roles in this value
destruction.This window won’t remain open forev-
er. Right now we’re not suffering from substantial-
ly overvalued equity anywhere in the US economy
that I know of, but if we don’t seize this moment to
identify the problem, talk about it, and learn from
it, we could find ourselves trapped once again in a
vicious, destructive cycle.
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CHALLENGING THE CLAIMS FOR THE
ROLE OF CAPITAL MARKETS
Like most people who learned economics since
1970, I was brought up on the efficient market
hypothesis. Like most people who learned eco-
nomics since 1970, I hung above my desk Michael
Jensen’s famous quotation of twenty five years ago
‘there is no other proposition in economics
which has more solid empirical evidence sup-
porting it than the Efficient Markets Hypo-
thesis’ (Jensen, 1978, p.95).
Like most people who have lived through the
1990s, I no longer have the faith in capital market
efficiency that I once did.
Professor Jensen acknowledges that stock prices
were routinely overvalued in that period. If I
understand his argument, however, it is that over-
valuation occurred because corporations provided
inaccurate information to the market, not because
of inefficiencies in the processing of information
by the markets.
It is, of course, true that some, perhaps many, cor-
porations provided misleading accounts of their
affairs.This is what is currently at issue in the legal
cases which surround Enron and WorldCom. And
we are now aware of the extent to which even the
most respected businesses used devices to smooth
their quarterly earnings reports – such as the spe-
cial purpose entities which became notorious in
the Enron collapse.
But I do not think it can be seriously argued that
all the fault lies with executives and none with
market participants.We need look no further than
the titles of – influential – books like Dow 36,000
or New Rules for the New Economy, to see that
mistakes were made in analysing information. We
need look no further than the evidence which
emerged in New York Attorney General Spitzer’s
case against leading investment banks to see that
misleading accounts of corporate activities were
propagated, not just by companies themselves, but
by those who made markets and purported to give
advice to prospective investors.We need only have
talked to a few participants in the great market
boom of 1999 to realise that they were motivated,
not just by reassessments of the fundamental value
of securities, but by the expectation that they
could sell the securities they bought at higher
prices to someone else within a very short period
of time.We have lived through the greatest specu-
lative bubble in world economic history, and the
efficient market hypothesis, at least in the form it
has been traditionally presented, cannot survive
that era.
Efficient market theory contains an important ele-
ment of truth. It stimulates us to ask ourselves the
question ‘what do I know that other people don’t?’
every time we buy or sell an asset. It goes with its
sister question ‘what do other people know that I
don’t?’ Reflecting on these questions can save us a
good deal of money.Many people,both profession-
al investors and corporate managers who engaged
in acquisitions, would be richer today if they had
made that reflection.
But I realise now that the question ‘what do I know
that other people don’t’ can have the answer ‘plen-
ty’. Never were the basic principles of economics
and accounting so conspicuously on trial as in the
last decade.How often were we told ‘there are new
rules for business success in the new economy’ or
‘old valuation principles aren’t relevant to knowl-
edge businesses’. But in the end, the old rules and
the old principles vindicated themselves, as they
were bound to.
So among the things that I know and knew that
other people don’t, or didn’t, are that the market
for mobile phone connections cannot grow indefi-
nitely, and that margins in it will come under com-
petitive pressure as other people enter: that the
internet reduces, not increases, barriers to entry inthe (comparatively small) number of industries –
classified advertising, financial services, entertain-
ment – in which it has economic significance; and
that there are limits to the likely profitability of
trading energy contracts, since market making is a
low margin activity it is difficult to make money
from on a sustained basis from proprietary trading.
Over the last five years, I have been glad to know
these things that other people didn’t, and have
even made returns from such knowledge that effi-
cient market theory says are difficult or impossible
to realise; but there have been nail-biting times on
the way.And I was glad that in 1999 I escaped from
both business school leadership and commercial
consulting, because in both these activities I recog-
nised the strength of commercial pressure to
espouse to doctrines which I knew – in my heart,
but more importantly in my head – were complete
nonsense. Not everyone resisted that temptation –
or wanted to.
When I learned efficient market theory as a stu-
dent, I also learned economic history, and I read of
the great speculative bubbles of the past. I first
learned the name Goldman Sachs when I read
Kenneth Galbraith’s great book on the 1929 crash,
and enjoyed the chapter entitled ‘In Goldman
Sachs we Trust.’ I wondered how people could then
have behaved so foolishly. But now I know. And I
also now know that my idealistic belief that what I
learned about efficient markets in the course on
finance theory made what I had learned about
inefficient markets in the course on economic his-
tory redundant, was false.
In understanding the events of the late 1990s, we
learn more from economic history than efficient
market theory. A remarkable characteristic of the
boom and bust was how it paralleled earlier specu-
lative bubbles not just in general but in consider-
able detail. Galbraith’s book is instructive, but I
found Arthur Miller’s play The Crucible, his
famous account of the Salem witch hunt of 1692,
even more valuable in understanding the events
that were taking place. Miller describes with great
skill the process by which nonsensical beliefs can
seize an entire community when childish folly is
whipped up by self-interest, opportunism and
social pressures.
So it’s an interesting moment for us to debate the
proposition that capital markets are an engine of
growth. The claims generally made for the role of
capital markets in stimulating economic growth are
of three principal kinds. Liquid and transparent
capital markets lead to a higher level of savings,
because they offer higher returns and greater con-
fidence in the realisation of these returns. The
transparency of market processes promotes a bet-
ter allocation of physical investment and a reallo-
cation of capital to the most efficient firms. And
active equity markets achieve effective corporate
governance by emphasising the accountability of
corporate managers to their shareholders.
All of these claims are hard to sustain today. The
US and Britain have the most developed capital
markets among advanced economies, and the low-
est savings rates. For the US, at least, there is a
direct connection. The story of US macroeconom-
ics since 1996 is fundamentally simple. Believing
themselves much richer than they were – taking
seriously the income and wealth projections
implied by inflated stock markets – Americans
spent accordingly, and borrowed the money to pay
for it from the rest of the world.
Have liquid capital markets created a better allo-
cation of physical investment? The national tele-
phone companies of Britain, France, Germany and
Spain are all businesses which have more or less
destroyed themselves in a frenzy of overpriced
acquisitions, the installation of fibre optic cable
capacity that will probably never be required, and
wild overbidding for third generation licences. It is
hard to argue that this represents a triumph of
market driven investment allocation. The best we
can say of it is that the market makes you pay for
mistakes. It does, but you can inflict a lot of collat-
eral damage along the way.
And what of corporate governance? I don’t want
to say more about Enron and WorldCom. At least
Europeans bring a touch of novelty to the process
of corporate destruction. The story of Vivendi
Universal, of the transmogrification of Jean-Marie
Messier from mundane head of France’s largest
water company into an international media mogul,
with glitzy Manhattan apartment and starlets by
his side, is itself worthy of Universal Studios.
The more serious failures of corporate governance
in the last decade are not, however, instances of
fraud and corruption. They are less extreme, but
often more serious, instances of the arrogance and
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incompetence shown at Vivendi. Coming here
from London, I am conscious of the failures of
once iconic British companies – Marks and
Spencer, for decades Britain’s most admired com-
pany, fallen from its pedestal, GEC and ICI, the
two largest British manufacturing companies at the
beginning of the decade, struggling for survival.
Marks and Spencer imploded. It sought to grow
earnings per share at the pace demanded by a pre-
mium stock market rating, and faster than the
growth of its underlying business. It succeeded, for
a time, by putting pressure on relationships with
suppliers, and its reputation for value for money
with customers – the factors which had been the
source of its competitive advantage for so long. In
1998 it achieved the highest margin on sales in the
history of the business – shortly before its profits
fell off a cliff as the magical reputation which had
been the basis of its competitive advantage began
to erode.
GEC, later called Marconi, exploded through a
process of meta fund management:corporate exec-
utives saw their role as managers of a changing
portfolio of businesses rather as asset managers
see themselves as managers of a changing portfolio
of stocks. The company disposed of its boring old
defence businesses in return for whizzy new tele-
coms ones. Today its former executives are spend-
ing more time with their families, and their present
executives much time with their creditors.
It is time to halt, or at least slow the pace of, these
capital market misadventures. The long-term
strength of companies lies in the effective manage-
ment of their operating businesses, not in their
relationship to capital markets.
The hubris about the US economy in the 1990s was
mirrored in a decline in European self-confidence.
The spread of American capital markets has been
represented as not only right, but inevitable. In a
bizarre reversal, the claims of economic determin-
ism and historic inevitability, once made by the
political left, are reproduced today by the political
right. The corporate collapses I have described
might have been expected to reduce the stridency
of these claims,but the unilateralism of US policies
after September 11 have increased them.If you are
tempted to think I exaggerate, let me refer you to
the symposium on the European economy in
American Enterprise in December 2002.
The tenor of that review is summarised by Mark
Steyn:
“I find it easier to be optimistic about the
futures of Iraq and Pakistan than, say, Holland
or Denmark. What’s wrong with the Islamic
world is relatively straightforward. With Eu-
rope, it’s harder to foresee any happy endings.”
In truth, differences in productivity between
Western Europe and North America are not signif-
icant. The important economic dichotomy in the
economic world today is that between Western
Europe and the countries – including the United
States – which West Europeans settled and with
the former Communist and underdeveloped world.
It is not a transatlantic divide. Holland and
Denmark have labour productivity levels above
those achieved in the United States.
And the cheese-eating surrender monkeys have,
since they were liberated in the second world war,
raised their productivity from the levels of their
British allies to those of their American allies.
French national income per head is below
American, but that is because the French take five
weeks holiday, and lunch; French national income
per hour worked is slightly higher. Not a bad way
to live: part of the reason, perhaps, why France
attracts more visitors than any other country; part
of the reason, perhaps, why I personally choose to
spend as much time there as I can.
It is no part of my brief, or my intention, to make
counter claims for the superiority of a European
economic model. There are many economic prob-
lems in Europe: those who point to structural
rigidities in the German economy are not engaged
in idle gossip. But in the last decade, Europeans
have been brainwashed into supposing that the
economic performance of European economies is
markedly inferior to that of the United States, a
claim which has no factual basis. We should all
agree that the market economy is the only eco-
nomic system which has created sustained and
growing material prosperity for large numbers of
people. All the twenty or so rich countries of the
world – two thirds of them in Europe – are market
economies.
But since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have been
presented with an account of how markets work
which is facile and which fails to acknowledge thecentral role of the social context of markets. Nor
is it sensitive to the genius of the coevolution of
technological and organisational innovation
which is the strength of the market economy. It
fails to acknowledge the complex structures of
disciplined pluralism which are its essence.
Capital markets are a necessary part of that mar-
ket economy, but they currently attract a dispro-
portionate fraction of the attention of business
people and a wholly disproportionate fraction of
business talent.
Professor Jensen raises the question:what should a
director of a company whose share price is over-
valued do? It is indeed a problematic issue, and it
is all the more problematic when the overvaluation
is a compound of misperceptions about the
specifics of the business and misperceptions about
the overall economic situations, as was typically
the case during the stock market bubble.It forcibly
demonstrates the problem created by putting for-
ward the creation of shareholder value as a corpo-
rate goal: shareholder value is a compound of the
realities of the business and the assessment by oth-
ers of that reality, and the latter aspect has as great
an impact as the former.
Let me offer what I think is the only possible res-
olution of the dilemma Professor Jensen
describes, but one with wide-ranging implications.
It is that managers should as far as possible ignore
the share price, and get on with running the busi-
ness as best they can. The experience of the last
decade has shown us that the capital market is as
much a forum for sophisticated, and often not
very sophisticated, professional gambling as much
as it is an engine of growth. That experience has
reasserted the truth of that. Keynes’s observation
in the aftermath of the greatest speculative bub-
ble prior to this:‘When the allocation of capital is
the byproduct of the activities of a casino, the job
is likely to be ill done’. To change the metaphor
slightly, but only slightly: speculation in company
securities, like betting on horses, is something
which it is impossible to prevent even if it were
desirable to do so: but the horses in the race
should compete against each other as best they
can with as little regard as possible to the punters
outside.
In the simplifications of an American business
model which applauds greed and asserts an ideo-
logical form of market fundamentalism,an account
has been presented of how capitalism works that is
at once repulsive and false. The consequence has
been an undermining of both the efficiency and
legitimacy of the real market economy.
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Good afternoon. It’s an honor and a pleasure to be
here today.I am indebted to the American Academy
in Berlin, vital for harmonizing German and
American ideals,for sponsoring my trip to Germany.
I have five observations to offer:
• First, our capital markets are the engines that
drive our respective standards of living, corpo-
rate competition, and delivery of all the prod-
ucts and services that make up our free
economies.
• Second, investor confidence is fundamental and
critical to the success of global capital markets,
and individual national capital markets.
• Third, investor confidence is predicated, in
increasing part, on notions of good corporate
governance, not just share price.
• Fourth, investor confidence wasn’t shattered
due to a lack of regulations or regulatory action,
and merely more regulations or more regulato-
ry action cannot restore it.
• Fifth, restoring investor confidence isn’t a job
for one regulator, or even all regulators; it’s a
job for every participant in,and every beneficia-
ry of, our capital markets.
After becoming SEC Chair in August 2001, we
were confronted with the tragedy of September
11th. Although occurring in the U.S., capital mar-
kets around the world felt its effects, demonstrat-
ing their interrelationship and mutual dependency.
Terrorism was followed by breathtaking US corpo-
rate collapses, reflecting a failure of corporate gov-
ernance as well as corporate malfeasance, misfea-
sance and nonfeasance. Companies like Phillip
Holzmann, Babcock-Borsig, Kirch, Polly-Peck,
Comroad, and MobilCom proved this wasn’t limit-
ed to the U.S.
In the U.S., these scandals produced adverse
investor reactions, and the value of world equity
securities fell. Indeed, last year US investors took
more money out of stock mutual funds than they
put in, for the first time since 1988.While German
business hasn’t traditionally been as reliant on
equity capital as are US businesses, the impact of
these scandals was, and is being, felt in all aspects
of our global capital markets, debt and equity. A
recent McKinsey study found that 50 percent of
investors surveyed now regard corporate gover-
nance as equal in importance to financial perfor-
mance when making an investment, and 75 percent
said they’d be willing to pay premiums for compa-
nies with good governance.
The erosion of investor confidence made us see
that the system of self-regulation of the accounting
profession was broken. We also embarked upon
long-needed disclosure reforms to improve the
quality and increase the timeliness of disclosure.
The SEC compelled the NYSE and Nasdaq to
improve corporate accountability and corporate
governance through listing standards. And, the
SEC’s “real time enforcement” program pursued
wrongdoing with alacrity.
Since then, Sarbanes-Oxley emerged, adding leg-
islative fiat with extraterritorial reach to already-
existing administrative regulation and securities
industry self-regulation. These responses reflect
that investor confidence is predicated upon two
essential components – an ironclad belief that mar-
kets aren’t rigged, and comfort that any who
attempt to rig markets will be caught and punished
meaningfully.
But, it’s also important to recall that neither the
absence of regulations nor an absence of regula-
tors caused our current crisis of investor confi-
dence. Everything uncovered since the fall of
Enron had already been illegal. Does this mean
there was no need for new regulations or regulato-
ry activity? Emphatically »not«. Government can
ensure that market participants operate in an envi-
ronment in which certain fundamental principles
that benefit the markets, and our economies, as a
whole apply. When a crisis of confidence occurs,the only solution is to provide assurances we’ve
learned from history, and won’t merely repeat it.
Thus, legislation like Sarbanes-Oxley, and the
extensive rulemaking it obligated the SEC to
undertake,were necessary – not to ensure that con-
duct that was already illegal became even more
illegal, but rather, to ensure that excuses, ambigui-
ties, oversights, inattentiveness and venality, had
even less justification.
The advent of Sarbanes-Oxley brought with it an
extended reach of US regulatory jurisdiction, caus-
ing consternation, especially on the part of the EU.
Thus, it’s essential to understand why US rules
have extraterritorial reach,and the extent to which
that is appropriate or critical.
The primary focus of US securities laws is to pro-
tect US investors and promote the quality and per-
formance of US capital markets. When entities
transact business in a foreign country, by definition
they subject themselves to the possible jurisdiction
and oversight of foreign regulators. We saw that
when the EU prevented GE and Honeywell from
merging due to European competitive considera-
tions.
Equity capital is finite. Since a US investor can
invest in US or foreign companies, there is compe-
tition for his or her equity dollars. Competitors for
those dollars should compete pursuant to the same
general standards. If not, some will have an unfair
competitive advantage. Worse, disparities in regu-
latory constraints may cause those subject to high-
er standards to seek to evade them in favor of less
stringent requirements abroad.
A statute with extraterritorial reach is not, there-
fore, uncommon or even unjustified. Those who
play in the same market should be bound by simi-
lar standards. Notice I said “similar,” not the
“same,” standards. That’s because global markets,
governed by global regulators, require global
accommodations.
The U.S. in general, and the SEC in particular, has
always recognized this principle. There are three
critical standards that must be employed in my
view in harmonizing different regulatory regimes –
equivalence, reciprocity and transparency.
Equivalence, or convergence, means foreign and
US regulators must produce standards and rules
that are substantively addressed to the same con-
cerns. We are well on the road to achieving that
result in the area of accounting principles.
Reciprocity requires that what’s good for the goose
is also good for the gander. Regulatory accommo-
dation is, and must be, a two-way street.And final-
ly, transparency means that, where differences
can’t be reconciled, they must be disclosed, so
investors know what they’re getting, and what
they’re not.
The SEC continues to make necessary accommo-
dations. For example, it extended the deadline for
non-US companies to comply with certain of its
new rules to July 2005, while most US companies
will have to comply by October 2004. Similarly, the
SEC granted a series of exemptions regarding
membership of listed company audit committees,
to accommodate foreign practices that would have
made it impossible for companies that trade ADRs
in the US to follow Sarbanes-Oxley to the letter.
Conversely, the EU has sought an exemption for
EU auditors from Sarbanes-Oxley.Requests of this
nature make sense, of course, as will careful con-
sideration of them. More problematic, however, is
the letter’s suggestion that, in the absence of
exemptive relief, it is likely that EU regulations
will require US auditors to register with the EU.A
tit-for-tat approach is inconsistent with the prac-
tices of the EU, and detrimental to developing
comprehensive and rational regulatory regimes
governing areas of common concern.
The answer lies not in interactions between regula-
tors and those to be regulated,but between regula-
tors. At the SEC, I initiated direct forums for for-
eign regulators to talk with SEC members and
staff, so we could avoid impinging upon foreign
regulatory systems. There is a need for more con-
sultation of this sort. It is incumbent upon regula-
tors to identify issues having extraterritorial
effects, and to work together before proposing or
adopting rules.
Even beyond regulations and regulators, there is
more that must be done, and more who must do it.
The people who benefit most from the safe and
sound operation of our capital markets – account-
ants, lawyers, securities market professionals, cor-
porate officers and directors – must also assume
the burden of making the system work.Confidence
only comes if investors believe those who take
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their money, or make money from their invest-
ments, care about what happens to them. No
amount of government, in any form, or in any
country, can provide that level of confidence by
itself.
Forces outside the corporation,but within the mar-
ket place, will require companies to pursue
investor confidence. For example, rating agencies
have indicated they will rate governance in deter-
mining debt ratings. This, of course, will have a
direct, bottom line, impact on the cost of raising
capital in the non-equity markets. Similarly, insur-
ance companies, which have been hit hard in mak-
ing payments on behalf of those companies that
have surfaced with problems, will condition the
grant of D&O (Directors and Officers) and E&O
(Errors and Omissions) insurance policies, and the
premiums for those policies,on the extent to which
good governance prevails.
What this means is that, one way or another, wit-
tingly or not, corporations will be compelled to
meet new governance standards in order to sur-
vive; once they do, our capital markets will again
function efficiently as the engines of growth and




RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN CAPITAL
MARKETS
Aftermath of a bursting bubble 
The overarching topic of this afternoon’s first
panel discussion is “The capital markets as a
growth engine”. Indeed, the ability of capital mar-
kets to provide long-term funding for growth-pro-
moting investment has suffered visibly since the
waning of the global stock market boom.
The bursting of the stock market bubble, in particu-
lar the “new economy” bubble, was accompanied by
a series of confidence shocks caused by the conflu-
ence of cyclical, structural and political problems.
The impact of the market correction was aggravated
by accounting irregularities and major corporate
failures and scandals. Therefore, a large segment of
my remarks will be devoted to the reliability of
financial reporting and incentive structures.
Enron and Worldcom are undoubtedly the most
prominent examples of abuses and excesses during
the preceding boom. Yet in Germany, too, the
“Neuer Markt” for innovative enterprises saw its
share of fraudulent activities. These scandals –
along with the disillusionment at not living after all
in a new era with continuously higher productivity
growth rates – have dealt the incipient “equity cul-
ture” in Germany a major setback.
The drastic stock market corrections involved consid-
erable losses of assets and also massively eroded
investors’ confidence in capital markets.
The repercussions of this downturn are being felt
not only in the financial sector but also in the real
economy and have depressed growth perspectives.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the
increased difficulties companies are having in
obtaining finance are due to the necessary market
correction in the wake of the bubble, the economic
slowdown or to the damage to confidence caused
by the scandals. It should be noted, after all, that
confidence is essential to the ability of financial
markets to function properly.
Why is confidence important?
A core function of capital markets is to ensure the
efficient allocation of capital. On the markets,
investors are constantly assessing and reassessing
yield opportunities and the risks associated with
alternative forms of investment. An assessment of
the risk-return profile of a capital investment in a
firm is predicated on reliable financial reporting.
In the interests of the capital suppliers – and, of
course, other stakeholders as well – a true and fair
view of the actual situation regarding assets, liabil-
ities, profits and risks needs to be ensured.
Doubts about the reliability of financial reporting
are affecting lenders’ and investors’ appetite for
risks.One sign that uncertainty is on the rise is that
companies are finding it more difficult to obtain
financing. This is especially true for the funding of
young,innovative firms which have the potential to
drive economic growth.
I would like to mention just one example to illus-
trate my point: The number of new companies
which were floated on stock markets in Germany
has fallen dramatically.Whereas the years 1999 and
2000 saw some 175 and 140 initial public offerings
(IPOs),respectively,in 2002 this number fell to less
than 10.1
Another sign of higher risk aversion is that
investors are demanding a higher risk premium: in
other words, it is getting more expensive for com-
panies to borrow funds, especially long-term. This
is visible in the corporate bond markets, where
losses in confidence were accompanied by a rise in
credit risk spreads compared with risk-free govern-
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ment bonds. In the stock markets, heightened
uncertainty is probably part of the reason for the
increase in the equity risk premia being sought by
investors, which is straining share prices even in
the event of unchanged profit expectations.
All in all, restoring confidence in the reliability of
financial reporting is the key to helping the corpo-
rate sector to obtain finance on more favourable
terms. At this stage, it has to be pointed out that
this comprises several elements. It is not enough to
close loopholes in accounting rules.
Instead, and even more importantly, the incentives
have to be strengthened to produce adequate
financial reports as well as to certify, to disclose
and to analyse them. The remedy must therefore
begin with internal and external bodies, i.e. with
management, auditors, participating investment
bankers and other market participants. Serious
misalignments of incentives of these parties and
failures of key checks and balances were the core
problems in the reported scandals and have to be
tackled.
How can confidence be restored?
In order to restore confidence, key standards for
the functioning of markets and key incentives for
the relevant participants in the market process
have to be reconsidered. This is a complex issue
and careful work is necessary to improve market
foundations.
Authorities always have to figure out which mea-
sures should be left to the market process and
which issues require public sector intervention. In
principle, the public sector should confine its activ-
ities to setting the framework or taking “ordnungs-
politische Maßnahmen”.
The government needs to take measures especially
in situations where the self-corrective forces of the
market process cannot take hold owing to misdi-
rected incentive structures. One example of a
potential public intervention is the codifying of
best practices, in order to “lock in” progress in
market behaviour and extend it to cover all com-
panies.
In globalised markets, the development of ade-
quate standards and incentive structures is increas-
ingly becoming an international task. Only effec-
tive international co-operation among and consul-
tation of public authorities will guarantee the con-
sistency of measures, avoid regulatory arbitrage
and create a level playing field for market partici-
pants. This does not require identical standards or
practices across countries but rather a coherence
of measures.
An internationally co-ordinated approach should
also prevent cross-border market participants from
being subject to conflicting rules or unnecessary
multiple strains. This is predicated, however, on
giving much thought to where coherent measures
have to be implemented. Practical implementation
could be left to the national authorities and adapt-
ed to local circumstances.
More consistent international standards in, for
example, accounting and disclosure rules across
countries would also reduce uncertainty resulting
from non-comparable financial reporting and, thus,
contribute to reducing the cost of capital due to
cross-border capital flows. It would also promote a
more efficient allocation of capital across countries.
What types of measures can be taken? 
Over the last few months, there have been intense
discussions by market participants, national
authorities and international standard-setters and
organisations on a broad range of issues related to
potential improvements in financial reporting and
incentive structures. In particular, the Financial
Stability Forum (which comprises inter alia repre-
sentatives from G-7 finance ministries, supervisors
and central banks) acts as a sort of “clearing
house” and promotes reform efforts to strengthen
the underpinnings of financial markets.
I would like to group these efforts under four main
headings.
1. Improvement of corporate governance
Without doubt, personal integrity and competence
of all parties involved in corporate interactions
remain indispensable in dealing with potential con-
flicts of interest.
Checks and balances need to be strengthened in
order to ensure that CEOs and other executiveboard members, supervisory board members, man-
agers, audit and compensation committees and
external auditors fulfil their responsibilities and
obligations.
In this respect, new domestic and international
measures have joined existing initiatives such as
the German Corporate Governance Code (so-
called Cromme Code) and the German Federal
Government’s Ten-Point Plan of February 2003.
On the European stage, some months ago the Jaap
Winter Group likewise presented recommenda-
tions which form the basis for an EU action plan
expected to come out shortly.
The OECD has announced that it will review its
Corporate Governance Code with a view to updat-
ing it in the light of the lessons learned and the
progress made in developing national standards.
This is particularly relevant as the OECD code is
one of the 12 key standards for sound financial sys-
tems whose implementation is being promoted by
the FSF and other international bodies such as the
IMF. This is opening the way to strengthening the
international benchmark for adequate corporate
governance regimes.
Please let me add a related, more general, point.
The incentive structures of corporate governance
should not encourage a short-term stance of cor-
porate policy. The scandals have shown that some
equity-based remuneration schemes have promot-
ed short-term value maximation, which might
come into conflict with the long-term interests of
shareholders and other stakeholders. Therefore,
strengthening incentive structures towards long-
termism and sustainability of corporate policy
remains an essential issue in which all capital mar-
ket participants should have a significant interest.
2.The complex web of accounting standards
A key issue in this connection is the debate on the
advantages of principles-based accounting systems
over rules-based systems. The speed of structural
change in the global economy, the vast number of
financial innovations and the high capacity of
financial engineering, in my view, make a strong
case for using a mainly principles-based accounting
system such as the International Accounting
Standards (IAS). Even in the US, a more construc-
tive stance regarding principles-based accounting
standards is becoming evident, though rules are
still considered to be an integral element of the US
GAAP.
In the EU, all listed companies will be required to
apply IAS by 2005. The fact that a convergence
project has been initiated by the relevant bodies in
Europe and the US, the IASB2 and the FASB3,
respectively, in order to identify and to develop
global accounting standards, is to be welcomed.
From a European point of view it must be stressed
that convergence is not a one-way street. US
accounting standards also need to converge
towards the IAS to some extent. In the short term,
US authorities should also be ready to accept IAS
financial statements of EU companies for listing
the US – without reconciliation with US GAAP as
is now required.
3. Improvement of auditing
Shortcomings in audit practices and conflicts of
interest were the main reasons why the misleading
accounting practices of those scandal-rocked com-
panies remained undiscovered for so long. In addi-
tion, principles-based accounting standards, owing
to their greater discretionary scope, particularly
need to be complemented by high-quality accounts
audits.
Many countries and bodies have now embarked on
initiatives to enhance the quality of audit standards
and practices and to limit potential conflicts of
interest arising from parallel consultancy work.
There is now a consensus that compliance with
audit standards needs to be monitored by means of
effective supervision of auditors. A number of
countries have now established public oversight
bodies.4 Such action is also necessary in Germany
as well as at the EU level. The European Com-
mission is expected to publish an audit strategy in
May.
Let me stress, at this stage, that the extraterritorial
implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act need to be
reviewed. This act requires foreign auditors to be
registered and supervised in the U.S. if they audit
European companies listed on a US stock ex-
change. The potential prolongation in complying
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with the registration requirement for non-US audi-
tors, which US authorities are apparently consider-
ing, is a welcome step towards a position of greater
compromise, but it is not enough.This time should
be used to develop and present a European solu-
tion for supervising auditors which can be consid-
ered the equal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act so that
the mutual recognition of standards and oversight
systems can be achieved.
4. Disclosure and market oversight
Disclosure of high-quality financial reports is a
cornerstone on which market discipline rests. In
the light of financial innovation, disclosure prac-
tices have to be updated constantly to provide
comprehensive and timely insight into develop-
ments of the companies and their risks.
Suitable disclosure policies, however, need to be
complemented by functioning market oversight on
the part of market participants, such as banks, rat-
ing agencies and investors.
Concerning banks, I would like to draw special
attention to potential side effects of the fast-grow-
ing market for the transfer of credit risk. Without
doubt, this market has the potential to contribute
to the more efficient allocation of credit risks in
the financial system. However, it is worth asking
whether banks will still have enough incentives for
an ongoing and intense monitoring of the respec-
tive debtors even after transferring the bulk of
those credit risks to third parties.Therefore,poten-
tial investors like insurance companies should
strengthen their own credit risk expertise and risk
management.
At this stage,the role of rating agencies comes into
play, too. As “agents”, they assume an important
role for their “principals”, such as investors and
regulators, who delegate their monitoring tasks to
these agencies or use them as an additional source
of information.
There is no doubt that rating agencies, because of
their prominent role in financial markets, have an
obligation to fulfil: their methods, should be as
transparent as possible – for both the rated enter-
prises and the other financial market players.
Moreover, market players should also be able to
rest assured that the independence of rating agen-
cies’ judgements is not infringed upon by conflicts
of interest, such as outside consultancy services.
I would like to add a further aspect to this subject.
Often, precisely when the economy is performing
poorly, rating agencies are accused of being either
behind the market curve or of operating procycli-
cally in their judgements. I believe the complexity
of the tasks facing rating agencies must not be
underestimated, and we should not be tempted to
make rash judgements.
Let me also emphasise that private and institution-
al investors alike should be encouraged to assess
the disclosed information prudently in order to
make informed investment decisions. There seems
to be a need to promote investor education.
Support through appropriate macroeconomic
policies
Allow me to sum up.The road to restoring confidence
is long and hard. While a loss in confidence happens
quickly it takes time to rebuild trust. Many single
steps are necessary. Taken together, these measures
are mutually reinforcing and suited to strengthening
market foundations and restoring confidence.
The restoration of confidence will above all require
to overcome the current sluggishness of the global
economy.The bursting of the “new economy” bub-
ble has given many sectors a “hangover”, akin to
the aftermath of a wild party.
At the global level,the corporate sector is still bur-
dened with huge debt, overcapacity and funding
gaps in defined benefit pension plans. I suspect it
will take some time until the large volumes of debt
are reduced, huge losses are absorbed and restruc-
turing measures bear fruit.
Compared with earlier financial cycles,one main dif-
ference seems to be that,at least so far,there has not
been a severe disruption in the financial system.The
financial system has proved to be more resilient than
in the past. Nevertheless, banks and insurance com-
panies, in particular in Germany and some other
European countries, have come under considerable
strains, and their risk buffers have suffered badly.
This development has raised the question as to
whether financial institutions are withdrawingfrom risk-taking, causing restraints on credit avail-
ability. In particular, small and medium-sized
enterprises, which represent an essential part of
the German economy, have complained about a
more restrictive lending policy by banks.
There is no doubt that credit conditions have tight-
ened generally. This reflects the cyclical deteriora-
tion in borrowers’ creditworthiness as well as a
more prudent lending policy on the part of finan-
cial institutions. There are some indications that,
over the last few months, banks have continued to
raise their risk margins on commercial loans.
Further measures have been more stringent collat-
eralisation requirements and loan covenants. One
of the driving forces behind this seems to be the
less favourable and more uncertain economic out-
look.
Furthermore, individual banks are consolidating
their credit business in order to improve profitabil-
ity. It should be noted that the pressure to restruc-
ture reflects, not least, the high degree of competi-
tion in the German banking market. Companies
and households have benefited from the existence
of a broad range of competitors and relatively
favourable financing conditions.
At this juncture, there is no evidence of a “credit
crunch” in Germany or elsewhere in Europe.
Rather, the credit assessment of banks has become
more selective especially vis-à-vis highly leveraged
firms and companies at the lower end of the rating
spectrum. The ability of financial markets to pro-
vide financing is still assured, though probably at
higher rates of interest.
Fortunately, the quick end to the Iraq conflict has
removed some geopolitical concerns.The financial
markets are seeing a cautious easing of tensions.
Nevertheless, a number of vulnerabilities continue
to exist.They include
• the continuation of anaemic growth in Europe,
particularly in Germany, as well as in Japan;
• the fact that the large debt volume of US house-
holds makes consumer spending vulnerable to
the effects of a lengthy slump;
• the fact that housing markets in some countries,
especially the UK and the US, are stretched;
• the vulnerability of foreign exchange rates to
disorderly adjustments in light of rising global
imbalances.
Against this background, the contribution of mon-
etary and fiscal policy lies, above all, in following a
reliable medium-term track. Macro policy should
itself not create uncertainty, add to volatility and
destabilise expectations.
The current stance of monetary policy, in Europe
as well as globally,is highly accommodative.In par-
ticular, the monetary policy of the ECB is not a
barrier to economic recovery.The best way to help
restore confidence is through a steady monetary
policy oriented towards maintaining monetary sta-
bility. Hectic countermeasures and a short-term
monetary policy would, by contrast, only promote
the risk of “boom and bust” cycles and would, in
the long term, have a destabilising effect.
The requirement of a medium-term strategy
applies to fiscal policy as well.A “deficit spending”
policy is not appropriate, since potential cyclical
effects often dissipate, yet at the same time doubts
are created regarding the sustainability of the fiscal
position. In Europe, it is therefore essential for fis-
cal policy to continue to observe its self-imposed
rules under the Stability and Growth Pact.A more
promising approach would be to tackle the neces-
sary structural reforms, especially in the labour
market.
To sum up, improving the regulatory policy frame-
work for market processes and pursuing a medi-
um-term and reliable monetary and fiscal policy
are the best recipes for surmounting the current
uncertainties and laying the groundwork for a last-
ing upswing.
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